Are messages and files in VENTEX Connect end-to-end encrypted?
Connect protects messages, files, reactions, locations and additional content types on the client. Since 6 September 2026, the controlled version-3 path has combined X25519 with ML-KEM-1024 in hybrid PQXDH session establishment for capable devices and then continued protection through Double Ratchet. A downgrade guard prevents silent fallback for a device pair; devices that are not yet capable remain on a documented, versioned compatibility path. VENTEX claims neither complete post-quantum protection across all ratchet steps nor Signal equivalence.
Encryption libraries, API contracts and cryptography/multi-device tests.
The running service still needs routing, membership and timing information; metadata-free operation is not claimed.
Rotation, device, double-ratchet and membership proofs in the test stack.
Internal evidence is not an independent protocol and implementation audit.
Automated cryptography and key-service tests, 308 mapped counter-tests, 19 real-browser runs with 189 checks, multi-device and downgrade scenarios, single-use prekey allocation and a controlled production walkthrough on 6 September 2026; re-run on 9 September 2026.
The post-quantum component protects session establishment, not a continuously post-quantum ratchet. Rollout remains device-dependent and has not yet received an independent external audit.
Protected retrieval route, authenticated byte retrieval in the client and current production claim verification.
The service can read profile images. Retrieval requires authentication but does not require an existing communication relationship when an exact account identifier is resolved.
No senderId in message rows, signed authorship inside ciphertext, HMAC direct-chat values, recipient marks instead of device IDs in key envelopes, memberRef for reactions, favourites and mentions, and new read state without new receipt rows. In the current source/test state, the cold-start path reconstructs the identifier directory from encrypted account state and does not treat an empty proof set as success. History transfers there use one computed opaque target mark and skip older unmarked envelopes rather than guessing their destination.
The running service still requires limited account, relationship and technical metadata for authorisation and delivery. The live signed runtime was not updated by this website task; the new cold-start and history-transfer corrections apply there only after a separate app release and migration. Historical time/device references and retained security records remain visible until their defined refresh or cleanup path runs. Metadata minimisation is not metadata absence.
Upload grants, size/MIME/checksum validation and short-lived download URLs.
Malware scanning, DLP and server-side video transcoding are not active.
Are messages and files in VENTEX Connect end-to-end encrypted?
No. The architecture is Signal-inspired but independently implemented, not Signal-compatible and not equivalent to libsignal. Without an independent cryptographic and implementation audit, an equivalence claim would not be defensible.
No. Version 3 adds hybrid post-quantum protection to new session establishment for capable devices. The following Double Ratchet is not a fully post-quantum ratchet; that remains a separate, unimplemented stage.
No. The intended architecture uses private object storage and short-lived signed access paths.
