VENTEXCONNECTSECURITAS EX VIGILANTIA
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Abrir Connect
All evidenceGRD-03 / Content protection

How does Connect protect messages and files?

Are messages and files in VENTEX Connect end-to-end encrypted?

Direct answer

Connect includes client-protected messages, files and reactions, device-bound key envelopes and a versioned double-ratchet pilot. VENTEX does not claim an externally audited, universally enforced E2EE protocol for every conversation.

Content encryption, key distribution, upload validation and private object storage.
Claim ledger03 ENTRIES
CRY-01Implemented

Message, file and reaction content has protected client payloads.

Evidence basis

Encryption libraries, API contracts and cryptography/multi-device tests.

Deliberate boundary

The communication graph and necessary delivery metadata remain visible to the service.

CRY-02Internally evidenced

Device envelopes, epochs and sender chains constrain key access and support rotation.

Evidence basis

Rotation, device, double-ratchet and membership proofs in the test stack.

Deliberate boundary

Internal evidence is not an independent protocol and implementation audit.

FIL-03Implemented

Uploads are bound to a user and conversation and do not use public buckets.

Evidence basis

Upload grants, size/MIME/checksum validation and short-lived download URLs.

Deliberate boundary

Malware scanning, DLP and server-side video transcoding are not active.

What does not follow
  • No equivalence with Signal or an audited standard protocol.
  • No invisibility of all metadata from the operator.
  • No protection from an unlocked or compromised endpoint.
Evaluate before adoption
  1. 01Which content and metadata arise in the specific use case?
  2. 02Are external audit, DLP or malware scanning mandatory before the pilot?
  3. 03How will key rotation, device loss and member removal be exercised?
Related primary pages
Security modelRelease assuranceResponsible disclosure
FAQ / FACTS

Short answers

Are messages and files in VENTEX Connect end-to-end encrypted?

No. Without an independent cryptographic and implementation audit, that equivalence would not be defensible.

No. The intended architecture uses private object storage and short-lived signed access paths.